Introduction
It takes two to tango. It also takes two to talk on the phone, exchange e-mails, share files, or hold a video conference. Consumption of communications services generally involve two (or more) parties who take actions, receive benefits, and bear costs. The fact that multiple parties consume a single message gives rise to external effects, also referred to as network effects. Previous authors have distinguished two types of effect.
1 One is an access externality, whereby benefits accrue to existing members of a network when a new user joins the network and thus can receive messages that the original members value sending to her. The other is a call externality, which comprises the benefits enjoyed by a user who receives a message initiated by another user.
With a few notable exceptions (discussed below), previous theoretical work on communications pricing has tended to note the possibility of call externalities and then ignore them. 2 This treatment typically is justified by one of two assumptions: either the receiving party enjoys no benefits from a message exchange or the effects between two parties are internalized.
The first assumption clearly is unrealistic. If it were correct, we would never answer the telephone or read our e-mail. The second assumption is applicable only to certain situations in which either the two communicating parties are altruistic with respect to one another or the parties exchanging messages have an repeated relationship.
3
In this paper, we examine the retail pricing implications of call externalities. We examine socially optimal pricing with and without a requirement that network revenues cover costs. We also characterize the profitmaximizing outcome. To simplify the analysis, we assume the set of parties connected to the network is invariant with respect to pricing. 4 A form of access externalities still arises, however, because the receiver must choose to accept the message. We also abstract from repeated-play considerations. In particular, each party is motivated only by his or her private benefit and the price he or she faces for a given potential message exchange.
When both parties benefit from a message exchange, it is feasible to charge both the sender and receiver positive prices. In the absence of a binding profitability constraint for the communications network, the prices for sending and receiving a message should sum to less than the marginal message cost as a means of internalizing the call and access externalities.
In the presence of a binding profitability constraint, socially optimal pricing entails trading off the effects on the origination and acceptance of messages as the sending and receiving prices are varied along an iso-profit line. We characterize the social and private optima for particular classes of message valuation distributions.
In addition to showing that it often is optimal to have the receiving party bear a positive fraction of the cost of exchanging a message, we establish that 3 Willig (1979, pages 124-25) establishes conditions under which call externalities will be internalized in the demand for sending messages and thus can be incorporated into the standard analysis of access externalities. Essentially the condition is that sending a message triggers a set number of incoming messages. See Hermalin and Katz (2001) for a simple game-theoretic model in which users can (partially) internalize call externalities by engaging in tit-for-tat message intitiation. 4 For analyses of network connection decisions, see Hahn (2000) , Littlechild (1975) , Rohlfs (1974), and Squire (1973) . CHECK SRINAGESH AND GONG.
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there is value to providing senders a restricted menu of pricing options (where different elements of the menu apportion the cost burdens differently between sender and receiver). We also show technologies that allow the reciever to identify the sender before making an acceptance decision (e.g., caller ID) can raise or lower welfare depending on the distributions of message exchange valuations. Lastly, we show that, when either of two parties can initiate a message exchange, setting the send price greater than the receive price can lead to socially wasteful strategic delay by the parties.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After introducing notation and preliminary concepts, we consider situations in which a given message can originate from only one of the two parties. In the following section we then examine situations in which both parties know the value of exchanging a message and either one can be the sender.
Preliminaries
Consider two individuals, A and B, who may wish to communicate. We model the communication beween A and B as the exchange of a single message, which can be a telephone call, a paging message, a data file, an e-mail, or a video conference call, for example. One party initiates the communication (e.g., phones the other) and the other party receives the communication (e.g., answers the phone). We will sometimes refer to the communication initiator as the message sender and the communication receiver as the message receiver, although even when using this language we are allowing for possible back and forth (e.g., an entire phone conversation is treated as a message).
The possibility of back and forth communication points out that, in reality, messages can be of different sizes or lengths. This fact can be accommodated within our framework if we assume that message size or length is Draft 4/30/2001 fixed conditional on the information to be communicated (e.g., certain electronic files are worthless unless received in their entirety, ordering something over the phone is worthless unless a fixed set of information is exchanged, etc.). In that case, our working with discrete messages is nothing more than a normalization of units.
When message size or length is endogenous, potential variations in message length can, but need not, have consequences for our analysis. If communications can be divided into time units, bytes, or other packets of data, then our discrete message becomes a sequence of message "atoms," which may be sent sequentially by one party or may be part of a back-and-forth exchange by both parties. Repeated or sequential communication is consequential when the exchange of a message today affects the parties' future message exchanges with each other. One reason for such an intertemporal link is substitution and complementarities across messages. For instance, the value of beginning a story typically depends on whether its end will be communicated. Linkages across messages can also be important because two parties have tacit or explicit agreements to share the responsibility for initiating messages (e.g., by alternating who sends a message to whom).
5 We leave exploration of these issues to future work.
We ignore income effects by assuming that consumers have quasi-linear utility functions. That is, user j's utility is χv j + y, where v j is party j's value or benefit from communication, y is her consumption of a composite commodity comprising all other goods and services, and χ is equal to one if she exchanges a message and zero otherwise. 6 In addition to ignoring income 5 An earlier analysis, Hermalin and Katz (2001, §3.5) , demonstrated that repeat play could help internalize call externalities. But that analysis also showed that, even if the players were arbitrarily patient, there would still be circumstances in which these externalities are not appropriately internalized.
6 Willig (1979) provides a rigorous justification of the use of the consumer surplus
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effects triggered by changes in communications costs, we also assume that the marginal social utility of a dollar of income to a user is equal across all users.
Thus, we do not consider the use of telecommunications pricing as means of achieving socially desirable redistribution of income among households. We take total surplus, the sum of producer and consumer surplus, as our measure of welfare.
The cost of exchanging a message between A and B is m > 0. One might hold the view that, for local telephony, m is so small as to be meaningless.
On the other hand, m is of greater significance for wireless and long-distance calling, especially certain types of international calling. Moreover, the costs associated with sending other forms of messages, such as video files, can be significant. Finally, we note that even when the network's cost of transmitting a message is small, users may still incur significant opportunity costs in terms of the time expended exchanging messages (e.g., answering a telemarketing call during dinner). These costs could be modeled by allowing value of v j to be negative. However, we will normalize v j and m so that v j ≥ 0.
The parties' values of communicating, v A and v B , could be unknown to them at the time they make their send and receive decisions. This fact introduces issues of correlation, learning, and prior knowledge. Specifically, each individual has some prior knowledge (type, signal, etc.) , ω j ∈ Ω j , where
which is common knowledge. Each vector ω defines a joint distribution over
We use g(·) to denote the associated joint, marginal, and conditional densities.
Our focus is on whether prices can induce socially optimal outcomes.
Under the first-best outcome, total surplus is maximized if all messages for approach in the presence of income effects. Previous theoretical examinations of retail pricing in the presence of call externalities, Hahn (2000) , Squire (1973), and Srinagesh and Gong (1996) , implicitly examine the one-way calling case. 7 While any user in these models can both send and receive messages, the sets of messages sent and received are independent of each other. In effect, each consumer is modeled as participating in a pair of one-way situations. Squire considers socially optimal pricing under the assumption that all users have the same expected benefits from receiving a message. In this case, the call externality can be perfectly internalized by setting a receive price equal to the common expected value and then reducing the send price by the same amount. Srinagesh and Gong consider more general distribution, and identify implicit welfare tradeoffs for two cases. In the first, receivers cannot refuse to accept messages, while in the second receivers can selectively block low-value messages. As the authors note, these are polar cases and in many situations are unrealistic. For instance, a consumer receiving a voice telephone message can refuse to answer but cannot make this decision based on the value of the call. Lastly, Hahn characterizes the profit-maximizing non-uniform price schedule for sending messages. He does not, however, allow for non-zero receive prices. We extend the literature by characterizing optimal send and receive prices for a variety of situations, including two-way calling and realistic settings in which re-7 In addition to these papers on retail pricing, DeGraba (2000) investigates optimal interconnection prices in a multi-network model in which one half of the benefits of each message exchange accrue to the receiver. As we show in the next section, first-best message exchange can be attained in this case by setting both the send and receive prices equal to one half of the marginal cost of message exchange.
ceivers can refuse to accept messages but must do so on the basis of limited information about incoming messages. We also explore the effects of pricing menus.
One-way Calling Decisions
Suppose that only party A can send a message. A strategy for party j is a mapping, σ j , from her type space and the prices to {0, 1}, where 0 denotes no action (i.e., not calling or not answering) and 1 denotes action (i.e., calling or answering). For most of the analysis, we assume the network provider is restricted to uniform pricing: If a message is exchanged, the sender pays p and the receiver pays r. Otherwise no payments are made (e.g., there is no charge if the receiver refuses to accept the message). In this case, a strategy is a mapping σ : Ω × R 2 → {0, 1}. Note the inverse mapping σ −1 is thus a mapping from {0, 1} to Ω × R 2 . Given that we assume the prices are common knowledge, we will shorten the notation by writing expressions such
Similarly, we will suppress the price arguments in σ (e.g., we'll write σ A (ω A ) in place of σ A (ω A , p, r)).
Holding fixed the presumed strategy of the other party, the best responses for the message initiator or sender, A, and the message recipient, B, are
and
respectively. Both to avoid the complications that could ensue from updating on impossible events and because the problem would be pointless otherwise,
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we assume that σ −1 j (1) has positive probability in any equilibrium of interest (i.e., some types of sender send and some types of receivers receive in equilibrium).
Observe that among the many possible consequences of this structure is The possibility of complex inferences, such as illustrated by this example, makes the analysis of a general model extremely difficult. Hence, throughout our analysis, we maintain
estimation of A's value of exchanging a message with B cannot be improved by learning B's information.
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Obviously, our previous example violates Assumption 1. On the other hand, this assumption would be reasonable in the many situations in which only A knew that exchanging a message was valuable.
8
Because we've assumed the Ωs to be finite sets, we can put the elements of an Ω, the ωs, in any one-to-one correspondence with the natural (counting) numbers we want (i.e., create an index). Moreover, having done this, nothing precludes our treating the ωs as the index numbers themselves and using the natural order on the counting numbers. In particular, given Assumption 1, we can order the elements of Ω A such that the conditional expected value of v A is a non-decreasing function of the index, ω A . Using this convention (labeling), we can describe A as having a weakly dominant strategy in which she sends a message if and only if
Because the strategy is weakly dominant, there is no violation of the basic rationality assumption if we now assume she plays it.
If A is playing the weakly dominant strategy σ A (ω A ) = 1 if ω A ≥ ω(p) and = 0 otherwise, then B s best response, expression (2), becomes
We first examine the social optimum without concern as to whether the network provider earns non-negative profits. 9 The requirement for efficiency 8 Note that Assumption 1 does not preclude A's knowing information about B, including his identity. Indeed, if we think of types as being elements of Cartesian products of information sets, then Assumption 1 would hold if ω A = (ω B , ι), where ι was information known to A but not to B.
9 In doing so, we are implicitly assuming that that any funds needed to cover the network provider's costs can be raised in a non-distortionary manner. To the extent that subsidy funds are costly, they increase the social cost and, thus, should be accounted for in m. To achieve a socially efficient solution, prices would need to account for this increase in
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under Assumption 1 becomes one of finding prices, p and r, such that, for all ω A and ω B for which
We also examine so-called Ramsey pricing, where prices must cover costs.
Let p c denote the optimal constrained send price and let r c denote the optimal constrained receive price. In our model, the profitability constraint implies
Thus, when there is a profitability constraint, the same two conditions must be met, but there is a single parameter over which to search (e.g., p).
Homogeneous Receivers
In this subsection, we make the following simplifying assumption:
Assumption 2 There is only one type of receiver ( i.e., #Ω B = 1).
m (i.e., ensure that only calls for which the private benefits exceed cost -including the distortion -are completed). 10 We assume there are no network fixed costs. We do so to focus on the effects of call externalities. In the presence of economies of scale and a budget constraint, the sum of the send and receive prices would have to exceed the marginal message cost in order to recover the network fixed costs.
11 The problem here is among the simplest Ramsey-pricing problems, see Wilson (1993, Chapter 5 ) for a complete treatment of Ramsey pricing. Also see Ramsey (1927) .
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Notice that this assumption does not imply that all receivers have the same realized value of message exchange, v B . Instead, it states that they all have the same subjective distribution at the time they make their acceptance decision. For simplicity, we will drop ω B from the conditional expectation when Assumption 2 is taken to hold.
The following condition is central to attainment of the information-constrained social optimum: 
The importance of this condition can be seen intuitively as follows. Given the assumption of homogeneous receivers, Assumption 2, the only event upon which the receiver can condition is whether he is called. Hence, any pricing scheme induces the receiver either to accept all messages or to reject all messages. Unless the problem is degenerate, optimality can be achieved only if B is induced to accept all messages. In the absence of a profitability constraint, B's accepting can be assured by setting a low enough value of r.
Achieving efficiency thus reduces to inducing A to initiate a message if and only if it is information-constrained efficient. Being able to induce such a calling pattern is equivalent to being able to divide the set of sender types into two sets, one of which corresponds to the social-efficient calls. This is what Condition 1 ensures.
If there is a profit constraint, then Condition 1 is insufficient to guarantee that an information-constrained efficient outcome is supportable through 12 An example satisfying Condition 1 is
where α and β are constants, β > −1, and E {ε|ω A } ≥ 0.
simple pricing (even in the absence of network economies of scale). By Condition 1, efficiency can be achieved only if p is set to some p * satisfying
Condition 1, but B may not accept messages when r = m − p for any such p. The following condition assures that he will: 
thus, satisfies the definition of p * . Now, suppose there is a profit constraint. The following prices support the information-constrained optimum and satisfy the profit constraint: 
= r , which establishes the result.
Observe that if Condition 2 did not hold, then (4) would be reversed, which would make it difficult to find prices such that A would initiate communications if and only if it were second-best efficient to do so and B would accept these communications. Indeed, if the weak inequality in (5) is an equality -as is possible -then it would be impossible to achieve efficiency if Condition 2 did not also hold. When p = 1 = r, the first-best outcome is attained and B's expected utility is 13/6. Holding r fixed, raise p above 2. Then only ω A = 3 calls and B's expected utility rises to 14/6. B benefits from the increase in the send price because it induces A not to send some messages that B regrets accepting at a receive price of 1. If the increase in p were accompanied by a decrease in r, then B would benefit even more.
This example illustrates that a reduction in the cost of communicating, although a social good, can be privately harmful in the absence of side payments. Suppose, using the valuations from the example, that m had been 3.1, in which case p = 2.1 and r = 1 would lead to efficient exchange, satisfy the profitability constraint, and yield B an expected utility of 14/6. If m were to fall to 2 and prices were reset to attain efficiency (i.e., p = 1 and r = 1), then B's expected utility would fall to 13/6. 14 This result can be interpreted as a formalization of the fact that consumers could be better off if low-value, "junk," e-mail had a higher price or even a higher real resource cost.
We close this subsection by briefly examining the profit-maximizer's problem. The firm will set r = E {v B |ω A ≥ ω(p)} -because there is only one type of receiver, the network provider can fully extract surplus from that user. Hence, any distortion must arise in pricing to the sender. To see 14 Friedman and Marschak (1996) offer a different explanation for why reducing the cost of communication can be privately costly (indeed, in their model, it can be socially costly). Essentially, they argue it could be that a sender gets greater value from communicating truths rather than lies, so at high prices of communicating only truths are sent. But, if the price falls, then the sender may find it privately beneficial to send lies as well. To the extent this, then, destroys the value of communicating, the outcome can be privately and socially worse.
why, consider the expressions for expected profits and expected surplus. The network's expected profits are
where Ψ A (·) is the distribution function for ω A . Total expected surplus is
Using these two expressions, a revealed-preference argument readily shows that the profit-maximizing (monopoly) price exceeds (weakly) the surplusmaximizing price. 
Heterogeneous Receivers
So far, we have assumed that there is only one type of receiver. Not surprisingly, achieving the information-constrained efficient outcome is less likely in the more common situation in which a single pricing scheme applies to heterogeneous receivers. Condition 1 remains a sufficient condition (but is no longer necessary) for attainment of the first best in the absence of network profitability constraint. 16 However, it appears unlikely that a single value of p * would correctly divide the space into efficient and inefficient calls for all receiver types. Condition 2, on the other hand, will hold for all receivers
15 Using a standard revealed-preference argument, it can be shown that
where p * is the surplus-maximizing price and p m is the profit-maximizing price. This can be satisfied only if p * ≤ p m .
16 It is no longer necessary because there may be values of r that induce some types of receiver to accept calls while other types do not. The price r is a somewhat less blunt instrument than in the case of a single receiver type.
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Thus, for instance, Condition 2 holds whenever the sender and receiver's values are pairwise positively correlated or are independent.
Some progress in the case of heterogeneous receivers can be made if we assume each party's information is relevant only for predicting his or her value of communicating; that is, formally if the following assumption holds:
Recall the equivalent expression for A is assumed under Assumption 1. Given Assumptions 1 and 3, the parties do not draw on the behavior of others to form inferences about their own values of exchanging messages. 
The right panel of Figure 1 shows the set of messages exchanged when users face prices p and r. In the case illustrated, p and r sum to m and thus satisfy the network profitability constraint (assuming, as we have been, no network fixed costs to be covered). As is clear from a comparison of the shapes of the message exchange areas in the two panels of the figure, it impossible to achieve efficient message exchange -with or 17 Assumptions 1 and 3 make the most sense with truly one-way technologies. Specifically, our earlier story about two-way technologies in which only one party knows that the call is worth completing becomes problematical when r > p. In this case, a user would rather initiate calls than accept them, which can lead to strategic considerations similar to those of two-way calling.
18 Nothing in our analysis precludes messages with negative values, although they make little sense in this context for A. For convenience, however, we illustrate our analysis for positive-value messages only. without a network profit constraint -using only simple pricing. The next result helps characterize the optimal second-best pricing in the presence of a network profitability constraint.
is the density associated with
Consider prices p and r = m − p; that is, prices that satisfy the breakeven constraint. Expected welfare, EW , is
Recalling the definition of S i (·),
Integrating by parts,
We can now establish:
Proposition 4 Suppose the network is subject to a profitability constraint, and ω A and ω B are independently and identically distributed according to the differentiable distribution function Ψ(·). If expected welfare, expression (7), is a concave function of the send price, p, then the socially optimal prices divide the cost of the call evenly between sender and receiver:
p c = r c = m/2.
Furthermore, a sufficient condition for the concavity of expected welfare is that Ψ(·) be weakly convex.
Proof: Differentiating (7) with respect to p yields the first-order condition:
where S(·) ≡ 1 − Ψ(·). Clearly, p = m/2 solves the first-order condition.
The concavity of (7) ensures the second-order conditions are met as well. By
The second derivative of (7) is 
The first term of (10) is the product of non-positive quantities, so can't, thus, be negative. The second term of (10) can't be negative either. The left-hand side of (10) A and the latter uniformly, where κ A > 1. It is readily shown that (i) expected welfare, expression (7) is globally concave and (ii) 
S(z) = e
−z/µ and, hence, EW = 2µe −m/µ , which is independent of p; that is, any division of the cost will achieve optimality.
Turning to a profit-maximizing network, it is useful to divide the monopolist's problem into two steps. First, suppose the monopolist wishes to achieve a profit margin of γ per completed call. This is achieved by any p and r pair such p + r − m = γ. The monopolist wishes to choose the pair from this line that maximizes the probability of a completed call; that is, the p and r pair that maximizes:
The corresponding first-order condition for an interior maximum is
a solution. Equation (12) is sufficient, as well as necessary, if expression (11) is a concave function of p. It is readily shown that Ψ(·) convex is a sufficient condition for (11) to be concave.
Once the optimal prices p and r for a given γ are found, the second step is to maximize expected profits with respect to γ. For instance, if
Because the derivative of this expression with respect to γ is positive at γ = 0 (it equals S 2 ), the usual monopoly distortion of too few sales holds. Note, however, that conditional on this distortion, monopoly imposes no further distortion in terms of the optimal division of the cost and markup between sender and receiver. 
Menus
So far we've assumed that the sender faces a single price rather than a menu.
But a single sender price -and, correspondingly, a single receiver pricemeans that a sender with an exceedingly valuable message has the same chances of exchanging it with the receiver as does a sender with a barely valuable message. There is no scope for the sender with an exceedingly valuable message to volunteer to assume more of the cost in order to increase the odds that the receiver will accept the call. Giving the sender a menu of prices -and allowing the receiver to know the charge he correspondingly faces -provides a means around this problem.
To be concrete, assume that ω A and ω B are independently and identically 
Intuitively, the sender can be thought of as a monopoly producer of messages that she "sells" to the receiver at a price of r. Allowing her to charge a lower price cannot reduce welfare, and it can raise welfare to the extent that reduced price is closer to the monopoly price for some types of sender. This monopoly metaphor also points out that adding a receive price to a menu that is greater than the lowest existing price can reduce welfare by giving the monopoly sender added scope to exercise market power.
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To summarize: 
Caller ID
In this section, we examine the efficiency effects of caller ID, by which we mean technologies that allow the recipient of a message to identify the sender of the message prior to accepting it. Formally, caller ID allows the receiver to learn the sender's type. For simplicity, we model caller ID as imposing no resource cost on the network.
When called ID is not available, the analysis above establishes that the first-best outcome generally cannot be supported through simple pricing or even the use of pricing menus. Loosely speaking, there are two reasons for this problem. First, the parties lack a means of fully sharing their information and, thus, cannot coordinate based on their pooled information. Second, the parties lack a means of transferring utility between one another to harmonize their interests and promote coordination on efficient outcomes. Caller ID increases the information available to the receiver and, thus, partially ameliorates the first problem by allowing the receiver to condition his acceptance decision on the identity of the sender. However, because of the second reason-incentive problems-giving additional information to the receiver may make it more difficult to support efficient outcomes as an equilibrium outcome.
We explore these effects through a series of examples in which senders and
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receivers have scalar types and deterministic message exchange valuations.
Let a ij denote the value to a type-i sender of exchanging a message with a type-j receiver. Let b ij denote the value to a type-j receiver of exchanging a message with a type-i sender.
First, suppose there is no budget constraint. Then caller ID weakly improves welfare when there is only one type of receiver or independent calling values. For the case of independent calling values, caller ID has no effect on the equilibrium outcome. With a single receiver type, welfare cannot be lowered because, absent caller ID, the receiver either accepts all messages or rejects all messages and this outcome can be replicated with caller ID by setting r sufficiently low or high. However, caller ID leads to strict welfare improvements for some parameter values. This case arises when it is impossible to set the send price, p, to induce the sender to initiate a message if and only if the message is information-constrained efficient. In such situations, allowing the receiver to condition on the sender's identity may refine the set of messages exchanged.
The following example illustrates this possibility. 20 There are two types of sender, 1 and 2, and a single type of receiver, 1. Suppose that a 11 + b 11 > m > a 21 + b 21 and a 11 < a 21 . With these parameter values, it is efficient for a type-1 sender to exchange a message with the receiver, but it is inefficient for a type-2 sender to do so. However, given a 11 < a 21 , there is no value of p that will induce this pattern of sending. Thus, in the absence of caller ID, either all messages are exchanged or none are. Now, suppose the receiver can identify the sender prior to accepting a message and knows the value of the message conditional on the sender's identity. The receiver will accept a message from a type-i sender if and only 
Two-Way Calling Decisions
Now suppose the either A or B can send a message to the other, so that the calling direction is endogenous. The main consequence of endogenizing the calling direction is that it causes each player to face the choice of either sending a message or waiting to be sent one from the other party. If the price to the initiating party, p, exceeds the cost to the receiving party, r, then waiting is preferable conditional on a message's being exchanged. The danger, however, is that both wait and, thus, a valuable message may fail to be exchanged.
To model this situation, we consider the following highly stylized wait- 
Equilibria Under Alternative Pricing Regimes
Our analysis proceeds by comparing pricing regimes. Figure 2 illustrates.
When p = r parties may behave strategically to influence whether they are senders or receivers. Consider a sender-pays regime, under which p = m and r = 0. With sender pays, there is reason to engage in delay. Let τ (v) denote the time that a player with initial value v makes a call if he or she hasn't yet been called. That is, τ (·) is the player's strategy. From the perspective of one player, there is a distribution of times at which he will be sent a message if he does not first send one himself. Let Q(t) denote the probability that he will receive a message at time t or later (equivalently, will not have received a call by t). Note we can think of −dQ(t) as being like 21 We will not worry about who is the sender and who is the receiver when both parties' values exceed m/2 and, thus, both are willing to call immediately. We will simply assume the call goes through (i.e., there is no "busy signal") and the cost is split. 
Q(t)(ve
We now state several properties that must hold in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 τ (·) is non-increasing.
Proof: Suppose, counterfactually, that
Observe N (t) = −δe −δt Q(t) ≤ 0. By (13) and the optimality of τ (v 1 ) and τ (v 2 ), it must be the case that
This is a contradiction given that N (·) is a non-increasing function.
This result tells us that in any equilibrium, there exists a pair of cut-off 
That is, i would never resume at t 1 . By contradiction, we can rule out finite jumps. Or put differently, if there is a t such that a party begins to wait only, that time is the last time the party will ever call. Now suppose τ i (·) were not strictly decreasing for party i. Then there is an interval of v i s such that τ i (v i ) is constant. Let t * be that constant time. 
Welfare Analysis for Power Function Distributions
We can find a closed-form solution for a symmetric equilibrium if we assume that the distribution function, G(·), is a power function. This allows us to make explicit welfare comparisons between the two pricing regimes.
By Lemma 2, the equilibrium value of Q(·) is differentiable almost everywhere. The first-order condition for the best-response program (13) is
We can rewrite (14) as
When the equilibrium is symmetric,
Using this result in (15), the differential equation becomes 
K a constant.
Using the fact that τ (1) = 0, equation (17) can be solved for K, revealing
. Now, solve (17) for τ (·):
A consumer with value v 0 will never send a message after time t 0 if v 0 e −δt 0 < p. Consequently, the last type to call is v , where v solves
Some algebra on (18) and (19) yields
Recall that v ≤ 1 for all realizations and, thus, calling occurs only if p < 1.
Hence, equation (20) confirms v > p. In words, there exist message values such that a party values exchanging a message by more than the cost of sending one, but never sends a message because she is waiting to receive one at a lower price. This fact is a consequence of strategic delay. Figure 3 illustrates the set of values for which messages are eventually communicated.
For future reference, observe that the time of the last possible call is t ≡ τ (v ) = 1 δ ln 1 + γ pγ + 1 .
We now compare the two pricing regimes in terms of expected welfare for the case of a uniform distribution (i.e., γ = 1). When p = r, expected 
Under the sender-pays regime, expected welfare is 
A little algebra shows that
That is, expected welfare is greater when the message cost is evenly divided than when the sender alone pays. 
It can be shown that (23) exceeds (22) if and only if m < .513. In words, except for delay, sender-pays would yield greater welfare than would equal division when the cost of a message is low (roughly less than the expected value of a message to either party). But there is strategic delay, which is why sender-pays is dominated by equal division.
It is important to recognize that Proposition 9 depends critically on the distributional assumptions made. Suppose, in contrast, that v has a binary distribution on {0, m + ν}, where 0 < ν < m, and v B ≡ m + ν − v A ). In this case, it always is efficient to exchange a message because v A +v B = m+ν > m.
No message would be exchanged under equal division (i.e., p = r = m/2) because for any message one of the party's gets no benefit from the exchange.
A message would, however, always would be exchanged under sender pays.
24
Intuitively, this finding is similar to our earlier result that offering consumers 24 We are assuming here that the distributional assumptions are common knowledge between A and B.
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a menu of options can be efficient. In this case, the options are whether to be an active sender or a passive receiver.
Conclusion
We close by noting that several of the results of here and in the previous subsection indicate that it is not socially optimal to have one party bear the full marginal costs of exchanging a message. Yet, except in certain circumstances when someone on a wireless network receives a call, calls for which both parties pay on a traffic-sensitive basis are rare in practice. 
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